NFIU Uncovers New Terror Financing Routes Through Women’s Accounts, Dead SIMs and Crowdfunding

• Nigeria’s financial intelligence authorities have identified a set of increasingly sophisticated methods allegedly used to move money for terrorist networks, including accounts opened in women’s names, SIM cards registered to dead people, coded payment descriptions and crowdfunding campaigns disguised as legitimate causes.

The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, NFIU, made the disclosures in its 2025 Annual Report, identifying the methods as emerging terrorist financing and money laundering risks.

According to the report, male commanders and logistics operatives can secretly control bank accounts registered to wives, sisters or female associates. In some cases, the women may not know the scale or even the nature of the transactions passing through their accounts.

The NFIU describes this as “identity laundering”, where another person’s identity is used to distance the real beneficiary from the financial trail. Investigators may find that ATM cards, mobile banking credentials and PINs are controlled by someone other than the named account holder.

The intelligence unit also identified the use of pre-registered SIM cards and SIMs registered to deceased persons. Such numbers can be connected to banking alerts or mobile banking, making it harder to establish who is actually controlling an account.

Another concern is the use of coded transaction narratives. The NFIU said terrorist cells, including networks linked to ISWAP, can use apparently ordinary descriptions, codes, alphanumeric strings and different languages to conceal the purpose of payments and evade automated monitoring systems.

Crowdfunding presents another vulnerability.

The NFIU identified a model in which social media campaigns are presented as humanitarian or educational appeals. Hundreds of donors may contribute relatively small amounts, reportedly between$50 and $500, before the money is consolidated and distributed through remittance platforms and money mules in Nigeria

The reported methods have direct implications for banks, fintechs, payment companies and other reporting entities.

Traditional name matching is clearly not enough.

Compliance teams may need to examine account control, device and SIM ownership, transaction behaviour, unusual payment narratives, connected accounts and beneficial ownership when assessing terrorist financing risk.

The NFIU findings underline a difficult reality for financial institutions: a customer can appear legitimate while the financial infrastructure around that customer tells a very different story.

For AML and CFT teams, the warning is clear. The identity on the account may not always be the identity behind the money.