The Big Story- Nigeria Sanctions List Exposes Alleged Terror-Financing Links to BDCs, Bank Accounts
Nigeria’s financial sanctions framework has placed renewed scrutiny on alleged terrorist-financing networks, with the Nigeria Sanctions Committee (NIGSAC) listing 10 individuals whose designation...
- NIGSAC names 10 individuals in listings linked to ISWAP financing and BRGIE fundraising; regulators require financial institutions to freeze designated assets and report suspicious transactions
Nigeria’s financial sanctions framework has placed renewed scrutiny on alleged terrorist-financing networks, with the Nigeria Sanctions Committee (NIGSAC) listing 10 individuals whose designation records point to suspected financial channels involving bureau de change businesses, bank transfers and fundraising accounts.
The individuals appear among the first 10 entries on the committee’s official individual sanctions register, with six linked in the published records to alleged financing activities associated with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and four linked to alleged fundraising for the Biafran Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE).
The records, published on the committee’s official website, contain allegations involving financial transfers, foreign-exchange businesses and accounts reportedly used to receive or move funds associated with the groups.
The designations underscore the role of financial intelligence and targeted asset-freezing measures in efforts to disrupt suspected terrorist financing. They also highlight the compliance obligations imposed on financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions under Nigeria’s Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022.
The allegations reflect the published designation records and have not been independently established by this report as criminal convictions.
ISWAP-linked designations put financial transactions under scrutiny
Six of the 10 individuals are listed in records relating to alleged financial support for ISWAP networks, including cells identified by the committee as operating in Kogi and Okene.
The individuals are Babangida Muhammed Adamu Hammaj am, Abdullahi Umar Usman, Ibrahim Abubakar, Adamu Chiroma, Muktar Muhammad Adamu and Yakubu Ogirima Ibrahim.
Babangida Muhammed Adamu Hammaj am
NIGSAC’s record identifies Hammaj am as allegedly involved in an ISWAP financial network responsible for moving funds linked to terrorist activities.
The committee says he facilitated or utilised funds for the group, including the purchase of Starlink internet equipment intended to support communications and operational coordination.
The record also links him to Abdulhamid Muazu, described as a former Boko Haram spokesman who later defected to ISWAP.
NIGSAC states that Hammaj am is in custody, has been charged with terrorism financing and is awaiting trial. His designation is therefore a sanctions measure and should not be presented as a conviction.
Abdullahi Umar Usman
Usman’s designation centres on alleged financial support for the ISWAP Okene cell through Abbal Bako & Sons Bureau De Change Limited, which the committee identifies as a business he solely owns.
According to NIGSAC, financial records showed transfers of ₦3.5 million from his personal account to Abdulkareem Abdulsamad Ohida, whom the committee identifies as a designated senior member of the cell.
The record also alleges that company accounts were used to transfer ₦900,000 to Ohida, another ₦900,000 to Asma’u Angel Alabi and ₦1,000,500 to Hassana Isah Oyiza.
The committee characterises these transactions as material support to a designated terrorist organisation. The allegations raise compliance concerns about the use of foreign-exchange businesses and related banking channels to move funds to designated persons.
Ibrahim Abubakar
NIGSAC identifies Ibrahim Abubakar as an alleged ISWAP member who previously resided in an enclave in the Lake Chad Basin between 2015 and 2017.
The committee says he participated in the group’s financial network, facilitating the movement of funds to senior members and designated financiers.
Its record cites transfers totalling ₦1 million to Salawu Kubura Asimi and ₦1.74 million to Abdulkareem Abdulsamad Ohida, both identified by the committee as financiers associated with the ISWAP Okene cell.
The designation also alleges links to ISWAP structures and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s General Directorate of Provinces, including the Al-Furqan office. The committee further alleges that he relocated to Lagos in connection with efforts to re-establish an ISWAP sleeper cell.
Adamu Chiroma
Chiroma’s designation highlights the alleged use of corporate and foreign-exchange structures to facilitate financial transfers linked to ISWAP.
NIGSAC identifies him as a director and shareholder in Generation Currency BDC Limited, Nine to Nine BDC Limited and Zimar Integrated Concept Limited.
The committee alleges that he used these business connections to channel funds to individuals associated with the ISWAP Okene cell, including Asma’u Angel Alabi.
The case places emphasis on the importance of understanding beneficial ownership, company relationships and transaction counterparties when assessing exposure to designated persons and entities.
Muktar Muhammad Adamu
The committee’s narrative summary identifies Muktar Muhammad Adamu as allegedly involved in transactions connected to the financing network of the ISWAP Okene cell.
NIGSAC says he was a director of Manhattan Bureau De Change Limited, Generation Currency BDC Limited and Nine to Nine BDC Limited, and allegedly facilitated the receipt and movement of funds originating from Abbal Bako & Sons.
The record identifies a transaction dated December 25, 2023, in which he reportedly received ₦3,745,480 through his bank account from the bureau de change business.
The committee designated him as a terrorist financier on June 15, 2026. The available record does not provide a separate detailed entry under its “Reason for Designation” field, although the narrative summary sets out the alleged financial connection.
Yakubu Ogirima Ibrahim
NIGSAC’s record identifies Ibrahim as allegedly providing material and financial support to the ISWAP Kogi cell.
According to the committee, he collected and distributed funds to families of deceased and detained ISWAP members, allegedly acting on instructions from the group’s leadership.
The authority says financial investigations linked him to individuals and entities associated with ISWAP and that he maintained associations with designated members of the Kogi cell.
The record further states that he was arrested by the Department of State Services (DSS) on November 13, 2025, and admitted to significant aspects of his relationship with and support for the group.
The committee subsequently designated him for alleged terrorist financing and material support.
Four other names linked to alleged BRGIE fundraising
The remaining four individuals among the 10 entries are Ogumu Peace Kewe, Nwaobi Henry Chimezie, Eze Chibuike Okpoto and Ohagwu Nneka Juliana.
Their designation records refer to bank accounts allegedly used to receive donations or collect funds associated with the Biafran Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE).
Ogumu Peace Kewe
NIGSAC’s record says accounts held in Kewe’s name at First Bank were reportedly used by the group to facilitate the transfer of US-dollar donations into Nigeria.
The entry identifies the relevant accounts in both naira and US dollars and records her designation on March 6, 2025.
The committee’s stated basis is the alleged use of the accounts for fundraising-related transfers. The published entry does not, by itself, establish that every transaction through the accounts was unlawful.
Nwaobi Henry Chimezie
The committee says an account held by Chimezie at Moniepoint Microfinance Bank was identified through intelligence sources as one of the accounts allegedly used by BRGIE to collect funds from members in Nigeria.
His designation was recorded on March 6, 2025.
The case illustrates the role of financial intelligence in identifying accounts suspected of serving as collection points for fundraising networks. It also reinforces the need for regulated institutions to apply appropriate screening and escalation procedures when a customer or transaction is linked to a sanctions designation.
Eze Chibuike Okpoto
NIGSAC alleges that an Access Bank account associated with Okpoto was used to receive funds from members of local BRGIE chapters to support a self-referendum campaign promoted through the group’s Telegram channels.
The committee added him to the sanctions list on March 6, 2025.
The record identifies the alleged purpose of the transactions as support for the campaign. The designation should be reported as an administrative sanctions action based on the committee’s stated assessment, rather than as proof of a criminal conviction.
Ohagwu Nneka Juliana
The committee’s record identifies an account held in the name of Juliana Nneka Ohagwu at United Bank for Africa (UBA) as one of the accounts allegedly used by BRGIE to collect funds from members in Nigeria.
According to NIGSAC, the group reportedly operated a collection structure involving state-level administrators who gathered contributions from members and remitted them to its leadership.
Her designation was recorded on March 6, 2025.
The entry adds to the committee’s broader concerns about the use of personal banking accounts to collect and transfer funds linked to groups subject to sanctions.
What the designations mean for financial institutions
The implications of the list extend beyond the named individuals to banks, bureau de change operators and other regulated businesses that may encounter transactions involving designated persons.
Under the requirements cited by NIGSAC pursuant to Section 54 of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions are required to identify and freeze funds, assets and other economic resources belonging to designated persons and entities without prior notice.
They must also report freezing actions and attempted transactions to the Nigeria Sanctions Committee, submit suspicious transaction reports to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), and report relevant name matches in financial transactions.
The obligations extend to assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by designated persons, jointly held assets, proceeds derived from their resources, and assets held by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction.
The framework makes sanctions screening, customer due diligence, beneficial-ownership checks, transaction monitoring and prompt escalation important elements of compliance.
A name match alone, however, should be handled through the applicable verification and reporting procedures rather than treated as automatic proof that a customer has committed an offence.
A test of Nigeria’s sanctions enforcement framework….
The 10 entries demonstrate how the committee’s published designations span different alleged financial channels, from bureau de change transactions and company-linked transfers to personal bank accounts reportedly used for fundraising.
For compliance officers, the central task is to translate the published designations into effective controls: identify genuine matches, prevent prohibited dealings, freeze relevant assets where required, maintain records and report actions through the prescribed channels.
For law enforcement and financial intelligence authorities, the challenge is to ensure that sanctions measures are supported by reliable evidence, implemented consistently and coordinated with investigations and judicial processes.
The list is part of a broader effort to disrupt financial support for designated groups and individuals. Its practical impact will depend not only on publication but also on timely implementation by regulated institutions, accurate reporting and sustained monitoring of potentially linked transactions.
The underlying principle is clear: sanctions compliance is not merely a screening exercise. It is a legal obligation intended to prevent designated persons and entities from accessing financial resources, while ensuring that allegations are reported accurately and due process is respected.
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